Abstract
Investigating how and why accounting professionals share useless and harmful knowledge challenges designers of accounting systems and organizational leaders. In this paper, we extend self-determination theory (SDT) to investigate the influence of financial incentives on (1) harmful, and (2) masked, i.e., organizationally useless, knowledge sharing (KS) among accounting professionals (n = 428) by adapting measures from SDT to the professional accounting context. Although self-disclosed dysfunctional KS is infrequent in our sample, the results indicate that, consistent with the predictions of our extension of SDT, accountants with higher controlled (higher autonomous) motivation are more (less) influenced by financial incentives and engage in more (less) dysfunctional KS.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 45-65 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Information Systems |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2018 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018, American Accounting Association. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Accounting systems design
- Incentives
- Knowledge sharing
- Motivation
- Self-determination theory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Information Systems
- Software
- Information Systems
- Accounting
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Information Systems and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation