Against the Doctrine of Infallibility

Christopher Willard-Kyle

doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa082

Against the Doctrine of Infallibility

Christopher Willard-Kyle

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can t be wrong about but shouldn t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one s overall doxastic state worse.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	758-779
Number of pages	22
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
Volume	71
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa082
State	Published - Oct 1 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Keywords

cogito
defeat
higher-order beliefs
infallibility
self-fulfilling beliefs
veritism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

Access to Document

10.1093/pq/pqaa082

Cite this

@article{10c1b5ed8b404aa595a7192a4a27bb74,

title = "Against the Doctrine of Infallibility",

abstract = "According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can t be wrong about but shouldn t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one s overall doxastic state worse.",

keywords = "cogito, defeat, higher-order beliefs, infallibility, self-fulfilling beliefs, veritism",

author = "Christopher Willard-Kyle",

year = "2021",

month = oct,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1093/pq/pqaa082",

language = "English",

volume = "71",

pages = "758--779",

journal = "Philosophical Quarterly",

issn = "0031-8094",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Against the Doctrine of Infallibility

AU - Willard-Kyle, Christopher

PY - 2021/10/1

Y1 - 2021/10/1

N2 - According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can t be wrong about but shouldn t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one s overall doxastic state worse.

AB - According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can t be wrong about but shouldn t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one s overall doxastic state worse.

KW - cogito

KW - defeat

KW - higher-order beliefs

KW - infallibility

KW - self-fulfilling beliefs

KW - veritism

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85116354476

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85116354476#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1093/pq/pqaa082

DO - 10.1093/pq/pqaa082

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85116354476

SN - 0031-8094

VL - 71

SP - 758

EP - 779

JO - Philosophical Quarterly

JF - Philosophical Quarterly

IS - 4

ER -

Against the Doctrine of Infallibility

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this