An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

Qing Liu; Tie Luo; Ruiming Tang; Stephane Bressan

doi:10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382

An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

Qing Liu, Tie Luo, Ruiming Tang, Stephane Bressan

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

45 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
Pages	567-572
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781467364324
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382
State	Published - Sep 9 2015
Event	IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015 - London, United Kingdom Duration: Jun 8 2015 → Jun 12 2015

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Conference on Communications
Volume	2015-September
ISSN (Print)	1550-3607

Conference

Conference	IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	London
Period	6/8/15 → 6/12/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IEEE.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382

Cite this

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title = "An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets",

abstract = "In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.",

author = "Qing Liu and Tie Luo and Ruiming Tang and Stephane Bressan",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE.; IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015 ; Conference date: 08-06-2015 Through 12-06-2015",

year = "2015",

month = sep,

day = "9",

doi = "10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382",

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Liu, Q, Luo, T, Tang, R & Bressan, S 2015, An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets. in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015., 7248382, IEEE International Conference on Communications, vol. 2015-September, pp. 567-572, IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015, London, United Kingdom, 6/8/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382

An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets. / Liu, Qing; Luo, Tie; Tang, Ruiming et al.
2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015. 2015. p. 567-572 7248382 (IEEE International Conference on Communications; Vol. 2015-September).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.

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An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

Abstract

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Conference

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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