Competitive Procurement of Auditing Services with Limited Information

Monika Causholli, W. Robert Knechel, Haijin Lin, David E.M. Sappington

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations


We analyse the auditing procurement process when the client is initially uncertain about her/her auditing needs and when she/he cannot discern the level of assurance provided by the auditor. The client's limited information can lead to under-auditing and substantial rent for auditors, despite the presence of ex ante competition among auditors. The information asymmetry can also make it difficult for new auditors with superior auditing technologies to displace incumbent auditors. In addition, the asymmetry can limit the incentives of auditors to improve their technologies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-605
Number of pages33
JournalEuropean Accounting Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Automotive Engineering
  • History
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Engineering (miscellaneous)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)


Dive into the research topics of 'Competitive Procurement of Auditing Services with Limited Information'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this