Disaster Lending: "Fair" Prices but "Unfair" Access

Taylor A. Begley, Umit G. Gurun, Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Daniel Weagley

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We find the Small Business Administration's disaster-relief home loan program denies significantly more loans in areas with larger shares of minorities, subprime borrowers, and higher income inequality. We find that risk-insensitive loan pricing, a feature present in many regulated and government-run lending programs, is an important driver of these disparities in access to credit. The differences in denial rates are disproportionately high compared with private-market lending and government-insured risk-sensitive loan pricing programs. Thus, despite ensuring "fair"prices, the use of risk-insensitive pricing may lead to "unfair"access to credit.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)8484-8505
Number of pages22
JournalManagement Science
Volume70
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 INFORMS.

Keywords

  • credit access
  • discrimination
  • government lending
  • income inequality
  • unintended consequences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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