Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare impact of expanding the negotiation agenda of an international agreement between asymmetric countries (e.g., including specific negotiations over environmental regulations or labor standards in a conventional trade agreement) and demonstrates why such proposed expansions are contentious. A main result is that agenda expansions that provide more bargaining flexibility will increase the efficiency of the agreement but can result in a less equitable agreement that hurts the country that is at a bargaining disadvantage. Similarly, we demonstrate that decreases in bargaining game asymmetry can also make the disadvantaged country worse-off even as it increases global welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 782-804 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Economic Inquiry |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International.
Funding
We would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We would also like to thank seminar participants at the University of California-Davis, the University of Cincinnati, Miami University, the Midwest International Trade Conference and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference. Any errors are, of course, our own.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| University of Cincinnati University Research Council | |
| Midwest International Trade Conference | |
| University of California Davis | |
| Miami Clinical and Translational Science Institute, University of Miami | |
| Midwest Economic Theory Conference |
Keywords
- bargaining
- international agreements
- issue linkage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics