FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE MORAL SKEPTIC

In "From Rationality to Equality," James Sterba takes on the onerous task of defeating the skeptic about morally required action. Sterba rejects the principle of consistency as a defense against skepticism first because of the universalization argument, which is that consistency requires that one be able to universalize one's claims. Sterba offers two reasons he believes we should not attempt to defeat the skeptic with this principle, at least not without supplementing it with the principle of non-question-beggingness, which he takes to do most of the work in his argument against the egoist. The moral philosopher's goal is to establish, in the face of these strong assumptions against morality, that rationality requires acting in morally required ways, even in cases of conflict with self-interested reasons. Rationality requires acting in ways that privilege oneself by disrespecting the humanity or dignity of others.