Gendering legislative behavior: Institutional constraints and collaboration

Research output: Book/ReportBookpeer-review

98 Scopus citations

Abstract

In democracies, power is obtained via competition. Yet, as women gain access to parliaments in record numbers, worldwide collaboration appears to be on the rise. This is puzzling: why, if politicians can secure power through competition, would we observe collaboration in Congress? Using evidence from 200 interviews with politicians from Argentina and a novel dataset from 23 Argentine legislative chambers over an 18-year period, Gendering Legislative Behavior reexamines traditional notions of competitive democracy by evaluating patterns of collaboration among legislators. Although only the majority can secure power via competition, all legislators - particularly those who do not have power - can influence the policy-making process through collaboration. Tiffany D. Barnes argues that as women have limited access to formal and informal political power, they collaborate more than men to influence policy-making. Despite the benefits of collaboration, patterns of collaboration vary among women because different legislative contexts either facilitate or constrain women's collaboration.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages274
ISBN (Electronic)9781316534281
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1997 Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (all)

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