How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009

Tiffany D. Barnes, Jinhyeok Jang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

In presidential democracies, minority governments are widespread and the size of the governing coalition varies dramatically across legislatures. Despite substantial variation across legislatures, no significant research has been conducted to explore how the size of the governing coalition shapes legislative behavior. We argue that executives supported by a legislative majority have the necessary resources to promote the party; consequently, members of the governing coalition are subject to less partisan pressure. However, as the size of the governing coalition decreases, so does the executive’s political capital; thus, party leaders are required to exert party discipline to convalesce the party’s image. Using a unique comparative research design from Argentine provincial legislatures over an 18-year period, we provide strong empirical support for our theory of the conditional effect of inter-branch relations on legislative behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)301-319
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Area Studies Review
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2016.

Keywords

  • Argentina
  • Executive–legislative relations
  • Latin America
  • Legislative representation
  • Subnational research design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this