Information sharing in union-firm relationships

Anthony Creane, Carl Davidson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


Large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions. When they do, an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade. However, if the firm refuses to share information, the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance. This reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare. As a result, there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1331-1363
Number of pages33
JournalInternational Economic Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Information sharing in union-firm relationships'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this