Is it Really Easy to Detect Sybil Attacks in C-ITS Environments: A Position Paper

Badis Hammi, Yacine Mohamed Idir, Sherali Zeadally, Rida Khatoun, Jamel Nebhen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations


In the context of current smart cities, Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) represent one of the main use case scenarios that aim to improve peoples' daily lives. Thus, during the last few years, numerous standards have been adopted to regulate such networks. Within a C-ITS, a large number of messages are exchanged continuously in order to ensure that the different applications operate efficiently. However, these networks can be the target of numerous attacks. The sybil attack is among the most dangerous ones. In a sybil attack, an attacker creates multiple identities and then disguises as several fake stations in order to interfere with the normal operations of the system or profit from provided services. We analyze recently proposed sybil detection approaches regarding their compliance with the current C-ITS standards as well as their evaluation methods. We provide several recommendations such as network and attack models as well as an urban and highway datasets that can be considered in future research in sybil attack detection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)18273-18287
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Issue number10
StatePublished - Oct 1 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2000-2011 IEEE.


  • C-ITS
  • Certificate
  • PKI
  • Sybil attack
  • privacy
  • pseudonym
  • security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Automotive Engineering
  • Mechanical Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications


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