Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers

Timothy Harris, Aaron Yelowitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that link life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. This analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)520-522
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume124
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2014

Keywords

  • Advantageous selection
  • Adverse selection
  • Life insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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