Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers

Timothy Harris; Aaron Yelowitz

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.029

Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers

Timothy Harris, Aaron Yelowitz

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that link life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. This analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	520-522
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	124
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.029
State	Published - Sep 2014

Keywords

Advantageous selection
Adverse selection
Life insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.029

Cite this

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title = "Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers",

abstract = "This paper examines asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that link life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. This analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.",

keywords = "Advantageous selection, Adverse selection, Life insurance",

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Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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