Jamming a rival′s learning

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F′s ability and incentive to affect, or “jam,” R′s private learning about R. The model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require. I find the F wants R not to learn and the more uncertain F believes R is, the more F wants to jam R′s learning. Entry deterrence increases with an entrant′s uncertainty, causing R to want F to believe that R is more certain about R′s beliefs than R really is. Journal of Economic Literature: D82, D83, L13.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)585-599
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 1995

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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