TY - JOUR
T1 - Jamming a rival′s learning
AU - Creane, Anthony
PY - 1995/4
Y1 - 1995/4
N2 - Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F′s ability and incentive to affect, or “jam,” R′s private learning about R. The model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require. I find the F wants R not to learn and the more uncertain F believes R is, the more F wants to jam R′s learning. Entry deterrence increases with an entrant′s uncertainty, causing R to want F to believe that R is more certain about R′s beliefs than R really is. Journal of Economic Literature: D82, D83, L13.
AB - Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F′s ability and incentive to affect, or “jam,” R′s private learning about R. The model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require. I find the F wants R not to learn and the more uncertain F believes R is, the more F wants to jam R′s learning. Entry deterrence increases with an entrant′s uncertainty, causing R to want F to believe that R is more certain about R′s beliefs than R really is. Journal of Economic Literature: D82, D83, L13.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1995.1022
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1995.1022
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58149363687
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 65
SP - 585
EP - 599
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -