Manipulation and bribery have received much attention from the social choice community. We consider these concepts in the setting of preference formalisms, where the Pareto principle is used to assign to preference theories collections of optimal outcomes, rather than a single winning outcome as is common in social choice. We adapt the concepts of manipulation and bribery to this setting. We provide characterizations of situations when manipulation and bribery are possible. Assuming a particular logical formalism for expressing preferences, we establish the complexity of determining a possibility for manipulation or bribery. In all cases that do not in principle preclude a possibility of manipulation or bribery, our complexity results show that deciding whether manipulation or bribery are actually possible is computationally hard.
|Title of host publication||Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling - Papers Presented at the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Technical Report|
|Number of pages||6|
|State||Published - 2014|
|Event||28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014 - Quebec City, Canada|
Duration: Jul 28 2014 → …
|Name||AAAI Workshop - Technical Report|
|Conference||28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014|
|Period||7/28/14 → …|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© Copyright 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Engineering (all)