Abstract
This article extends Simpsons (2003) research on sex differences in social dilemmas. To test the hypotheses that men defect in response to greed and women to fear, Simpson created Fear and Greed Dilemmas, but experiments using these games supported the greed hypothesis only. In this article I focus on why the fear hypothesis failed and suggest that fear was actually absent in the Fear Dilemma. To retest Simpsons hypotheses, I propose a new asymmetric game, the Fear-of-Greed Dilemma. The asymmetry is important for two reasons. First, it creates the risk of exploitation that Simpsons Fear Dilemma lacked. Second, it exposes a critical limitation in Rapoport's (1964) K-index and suggests a respecification. Laboratory studies supported the fear hypothesis and found mediating effects of expectations about partners on sex differences in cooperation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1257-1272 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Social Forces |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2005 |
Funding
I thank Arnout van de Rijt, Michael W. Macy, Shelley Correll, Robb Willer, Steve Benard and anonymous Social Forces reviewers for valuable suggestions on previous drafts, Sang Lee for lab assistance, and Brent Simpson for sharing experimental materials. This project was supported by a research grant to the author from the Cornell University Sociology Department. Direct correspondence to Ko Kuwabara, Department of Sociology, 323 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-mail: [email protected].
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Cornell University Sociology Department |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Anthropology
- Sociology and Political Science