Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been established as the de facto paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. Information-theoretic secure MPC protocols, though more efficient than their computationally secure counterparts, require at least three computational parties and are prone to collusion attacks. Previous work has used mechanism designs to deter collusion. An important element missing is the consideration of how different players value privacy. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of possible outcomes under different privacy preferences based on the relative cost of collusion attacks over loss of privacy. We explicitly calculate the conditions under which honesty is the solution. Simulation results provide further evidence to demonstrate the validity of our mechanism design.
|Title of host publication||2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2016 - Proceedings|
|Number of pages||5|
|State||Published - May 18 2016|
|Event||41st IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2016 - Shanghai, China|
Duration: Mar 20 2016 → Mar 25 2016
|Name||ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings|
|Conference||41st IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2016|
|Period||3/20/16 → 3/25/16|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grants 1018241, 1444022, and 1237134.
© 2016 IEEE.
- encrypted domain processing
- game theory
- secure mpc
- signal processing
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Signal Processing
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering