Productivity information in vertical sharing agreements

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations


That firms share information with their rivals is both well-known and studied. However, firms also often share information with their suppliers. The firm's incentive to share productivity information with both its supplier and its rival is examined. It is found that by sharing productivity information a firm raises its own expected input price, which raises the rival's expected input price. In contrast, sharing cost or demand information does not have this effect. Through this price effect information sharing can increase expected producer surplus in price competition, while in previous work the sharing of cost information always reduced producer surplus.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)821-841
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Issue number4
StatePublished - Aug 2007


  • Information sharing
  • Productivity
  • Vertical relationships

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering


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