Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

112 Scopus citations

Abstract

Differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Following Wildasin [4] and Bucovetsky [2] the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a Nash game in the tax rate. The tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-131
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Urban Economics
Volume30
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1991

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Urban Studies

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