Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power

William H. Hoyt

doi:10.1016/0094-1190(91)90049-D

Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power

William H. Hoyt

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

115 Scopus citations

Abstract

Differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Following Wildasin [4] and Bucovetsky [2] the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a Nash game in the tax rate. The tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	123-131
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Urban Economics
Volume	30
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(91)90049-D
State	Published - Jul 1991

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Urban Studies

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10.1016/0094-1190(91)90049-D

Cite this

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author = "Hoyt, {William H.}",

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Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power

Abstract

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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