Abstract
Differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Following Wildasin [4] and Bucovetsky [2] the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a Nash game in the tax rate. The tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 123-131 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Journal of Urban Economics |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 1991 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.
Funding
*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.
| Funders |
|---|
| National Science Foundation (NSF) |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Urban Studies
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