Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment

Adib Bagh, Alejandro Jofre

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

45 Scopus citations


A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1715-1721
Number of pages7
Issue number6
StatePublished - Nov 2006


  • Better reply secure
  • Discontinuous games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Payoff secure
  • Reciprocal upper semicontinuity
  • Weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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