Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment

Adib Bagh; Alejandro Jofre

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x

Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment

Adib Bagh, Alejandro Jofre

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1715-1721
Number of pages	7
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	74
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
State	Published - Nov 2006

Keywords

Better reply secure
Discontinuous games
Nash equilibrium
Payoff secure
Reciprocal upper semicontinuity
Weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x

Cite this

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title = "Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment",

abstract = "A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.",

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KW - Nash equilibrium

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KW - Reciprocal upper semicontinuity

KW - Weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity

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Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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