Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico

Benjamin V. Rosa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)161-208
Number of pages48
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume67
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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