Saving mental fictionalism from cognitive collapse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Mental fictionalism maintains that: (1) folk psychology is a false theory, but (2) we should nonetheless keep using it, because it is useful, convenient, or otherwise beneficial to do so. We should (or do) treat folk psychology as a useful fiction-false, but valuable. Yet some argue that mental fictionalism is incoherent: if a mental fictionalist rejects folk psychology then she cannot appeal to fictions in an effort to keep folk psychological discourse around, because fictions presuppose the legitimacy of folk psychology. Call this the Argument from Cognitive Collapse. In this paper, I defend several different mental fictionalist views against cognitive collapse.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405-424
Number of pages20
JournalRes Philosophica
Volume93
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Meg Wallace.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Saving mental fictionalism from cognitive collapse'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this