TY - JOUR
T1 - Simulating terrorism
T2 - Credible commitment, costly signaling, and strategic behavior
AU - Siegel, David A.
AU - Young, Joseph K.
PY - 2009/10
Y1 - 2009/10
N2 - We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.
AB - We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.
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U2 - 10.1017/S1049096509990151
DO - 10.1017/S1049096509990151
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:74049139504
SN - 1049-0965
VL - 42
SP - 765
EP - 771
JO - PS - Political Science and Politics
JF - PS - Political Science and Politics
IS - 4
ER -
