TY - JOUR
T1 - Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences
AU - Creane, Anthony
PY - 2009/11
Y1 - 2009/11
N2 - Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.' However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.
AB - Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.' However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01559.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01559.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:70350409607
SN - 0008-4085
VL - 42
SP - 1578
EP - 1598
JO - Canadian Journal of Economics
JF - Canadian Journal of Economics
IS - 4
ER -