Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.' However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1578-1598
Number of pages21
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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