Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions for a game with discontinuous payoffs to be weakly reciprocally upper semi-continuous in mixed strategies. These conditions are imposed on the individual payoffs and not on their sum, and they can be readily verified in a large class of games even when the sum of payoffs in such games is not upper semi-continuous. We apply our result to establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in probabilistic voting competitions where candidates have very general utility functions as well as heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of the voters.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 99-107 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Volume | 74 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2018 |
Keywords
- Better reply security
- Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
- Probabilistic voting models
- Weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics