The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Betül Demirkaya; Patrick Cunha Silva; Brian F. Crisp

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Betül Demirkaya
, Patrick Cunha Silva
, Brian F. Crisp

Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

Original language	English
Article number	102496
Journal	Electoral Studies
Volume	79
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496
State	Published - Oct 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd

Funding

We thank Will Hella for his valuable assistance collecting some of the data used here. This project received support from the National Science Foundation . “Electoral Systems as Incentive Structures for Interparty and Intraparty Politics” National Science Foundation , Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Accountable Institutions and Behavior Program, Washington, D.C., Grant # SES-2048540 .

Funders	Funder number
Social Protection and Health Division	SES-2048540
National Science Foundation Arctic Social Science Program

Keywords

Campaign spending
Campaign strategy
Candidate vulnerability
Mixed member systems
New Zealand

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

Cite this

@article{fe0de3e00b8d492caa85145c88a57a07,

title = "The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems",

abstract = "In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.",

keywords = "Campaign spending, Campaign strategy, Candidate vulnerability, Mixed member systems, New Zealand",

author = "Bet{\"u}l Demirkaya and \{Cunha Silva\}, Patrick and Crisp, \{Brian F.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier Ltd",

year = "2022",

month = oct,

doi = "10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496",

language = "English",

volume = "79",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

AU - Demirkaya, Betül

AU - Cunha Silva, Patrick

AU - Crisp, Brian F.

PY - 2022/10

Y1 - 2022/10

N2 - In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

AB - In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

KW - Campaign spending

KW - Campaign strategy

KW - Candidate vulnerability

KW - Mixed member systems

KW - New Zealand

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85134393168

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85134393168#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

DO - 10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85134393168

SN - 0261-3794

VL - 79

JO - Electoral Studies

JF - Electoral Studies

M1 - 102496

ER -

The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this