Abstract
Some philosophers assume that our ordinary parts-whole concepts are intuitive and univocal. Moreover, some assume that mereology—the formal theory of parts-whole relations—adequately captures these intuitive and univocal notions. Lewis (Parts of classes. Blackwell, Oxford, 1991: p. 75), for example, maintains that mereology is “perfectly understood, unproblematic, and certain.” Following his lead, many assume that expressions such as ‘is part of’ are (i) univocal, (ii) topic-neutral, and that (iii) compositional monism is true. This paper explores the rejection of (i)–(iii). I argue that our ordinary parts-whole expressions are polysemous; they have multiple distinct, but related, interpretations or meanings. I canvass several criteria by which to test for polysemy, and apply these criteria to some of our parts-whole terminology. I also examine some philosophical examples involving abstracta and abstract parts, which give us additional reasons to think that our parts-whole expressions are polysemous and topic-specific. Yet if so, then compositional pluralism is true.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 4331-4354 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 198 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.
Keywords
- Composition
- Compositional pluralism
- Mereology
- Parts
- Polysemy
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences (all)