TY - JOUR
T1 - Trade policy in majoritarian systems
T2 - The case of the U.S.
AU - Fredriksson, Per G.
AU - Matschke, Xenia
AU - Minier, Jenny
PY - 2011/5
Y1 - 2011/5
N2 - We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.
AB - We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79955642378&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79955642378
SN - 0008-4085
VL - 44
SP - 607
EP - 626
JO - Canadian Journal of Economics
JF - Canadian Journal of Economics
IS - 2
ER -