Trade policy in majoritarian systems: The case of the U.S.

Per G. Fredriksson, Xenia Matschke, Jenny Minier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)607-626
Number of pages20
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Trade policy in majoritarian systems: The case of the U.S.'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this