Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

Leonce L. Bargeron, Frederik P. Schlingemann, René M. Stulz, Chad J. Zutter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

158 Scopus citations

Abstract

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)375-390
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume89
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2008

Keywords

  • Private equity acquisitions
  • Target abnormal returns

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this