Why Tariffs, Not Subsidies? A Search for Stylized Facts

Josh Ederington, Jenny Minier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


Barriers to trade are commonly viewed as a result of political systems in which politically influential groups benefit from and successfully lobby for protection. However, trade policy is a highly inefficient tool for redistributing income. Although recent theoretical research has focused on explanations of why (inefficient) trade barriers might be preferred to more direct means of redistribution, this research has been carried out with little empirical support. We address this gap in the literature with an exploratory cross-country empirical investigation of the economic factors correlated with a reliance on tariffs over subsidies. We find that the existing theoretical literature is consistent with the cross-country evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Article number31
JournalB.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2006

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2006 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.


  • empirical political economy
  • subsidies
  • tariffs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)


Dive into the research topics of 'Why Tariffs, Not Subsidies? A Search for Stylized Facts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this