Certifier competition and audit grades: An empirical examination using food safety certification

Yuqing Zheng; Talia Bar

doi:10.1002/aepp.13211

Certifier competition and audit grades: An empirical examination using food safety certification

Yuqing Zheng
, Talia Bar

Producción científica: Article › revisión exhaustiva

9 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Third-party certification bodies (CBs) audit companies to determine compliance with standards. Using panel data from the British Retail Consortium food program, a leading international food safety standard for manufacturers, we empirically examine determinants of audit grades. We show that on average, audit grades are lower the first-time manufacturers certify, consistent with certification improving food safety practices. Small manufacturers are disadvantaged compared with large (multisite) producers who obtain on average higher grades. We also test and support the hypothesis that a higher degree of CB competition leads to higher grades, raising concern for a potential conflict of interest in certification.

Idioma original	English
Páginas (desde-hasta)	182-196
Número de páginas	15
Publicación	Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
Volumen	45
N.º	1
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13211
Estado	Published - mar 2023

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association.

Financiación

The authors are grateful to Antony Harrison, Directory Services Manager at the BRC global standards, and Samuel Crome, Senior Directory Network Administrator for providing data and for their insights about the program. The authors are indebted to Haim Bar, Steven Buck, and Craig Landry for their comments. The authors thank Brendan Costello and Joe Roessler for outstanding research assistance. This work was supported by the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture Hatch project 1011683. 1 The authors are grateful to Antony Harrison, Directory Services Manager at the BRC global standards, and Samuel Crome, Senior Directory Network Administrator for providing data and for their insights about the program. The authors are indebted to Haim Bar, Steven Buck, and Craig Landry for their comments. The authors thank Brendan Costello and Joe Roessler for outstanding research assistance. This work was supported by the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture Hatch project 1011683.

Financiadores	Número del financiador
Brendan Costello and Joe Roessler
USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture Hatch
National Institute of Food and Agriculture	1011683

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Development
Economics and Econometrics

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Certifier competition and audit grades: An empirical examination using food safety certification

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