Resumen
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that 'I believe' is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.
| Idioma original | English |
|---|---|
| Páginas (desde-hasta) | 718-739 |
| Número de páginas | 22 |
| Publicación | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volumen | 103 |
| N.º | 3 |
| DOI | |
| Estado | Published - 2025 |
Nota bibliográfica
Publisher Copyright:© 2025 Australasian Association of Philosophy.
Financiación
This project was funded, in part, by Therme Group.
| Financiadores |
|---|
| Therme Group |
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