Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences

Ying Zhu; Miroslaw Truszczynski

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences

Ying Zhu, Miroslaw Truszczynski

Computer Science

Producción científica: Conference contribution › revisión exhaustiva

Resumen

Manipulation and bribery have received much attention from the social choice community. We study these concepts for preference formalisms that identify a set of optimal outcomes rather than a single winning outcome. We assume that preferences may be ranked (differ in importance), and we use the Pareto principle adjusted to the case of ranked preferences as the preference aggregation rule. For two important classes of preferences, representing the extreme ends of the spectrum, we provide characterizations of situations when manipulation and bribery is possible, and establish the complexity of the problems to decide that.

Idioma original	English
Título de la publicación alojada	Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Proceedings
Editores	Toby Walsh
Páginas	86-102
Número de páginas	17
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6
Estado	Published - 2015
Evento	4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2015 - Lexington, United States Duración: sept 27 2015 → sept 30 2015

Serie de la publicación

Nombre	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volumen	9346
ISSN (versión impresa)	0302-9743
ISSN (versión digital)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2015
País/Territorio	United States
Ciudad	Lexington
Período	9/27/15 → 9/30/15

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

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10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

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Zhu, Y., & Truszczynski, M. (2015). Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences. En T. Walsh (Ed.), Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Proceedings (pp. 86-102). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9346). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

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author = "Ying Zhu and Miroslaw Truszczynski",

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Zhu, Y & Truszczynski, M 2015, Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences. En T Walsh (ed.), Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9346, pp. 86-102, 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2015, Lexington, United States, 9/27/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences. / Zhu, Ying; Truszczynski, Miroslaw.
Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Toby Walsh. 2015. p. 86-102 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9346).

Producción científica: Conference contribution › revisión exhaustiva

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Zhu Y, Truszczynski M. Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences. En Walsh T, editor, Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Proceedings. 2015. p. 86-102. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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