Organizational Form and Corporate Payout Policy

Bradford D. Jordan, Mark H. Liu, Qun Wu

Producción científica: Articlerevisión exhaustiva

12 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We examine how organizational form affects corporate payouts. Conglomerates pay out more than pure plays in both cash dividends and total payouts (cash dividends plus share repurchases). Furthermore, their payouts are more sensitive to cash flows compared to pure-play firms. The sensitivity of payouts to cash flow increases as the cross-segment correlation in a conglomerate decreases. Corporate payouts increase after mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially among M&As in which acquirers and targets are less correlated. These results suggest that the coinsurance among different divisions of a conglomerate allows them to pay out more cash flow to their shareholders than pure-play firms.

Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (desde-hasta)789-813
Número de páginas25
PublicaciónJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volumen53
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublished - abr 1 2018

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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