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Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power

Producción científica: Article › revisión exhaustiva

118 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Following Wildasin [4] and Bucovetsky [2] the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a Nash game in the tax rate. The tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases.

Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (desde-hasta)123-131
Número de páginas9
PublicaciónJournal of Urban Economics
Volumen30
N.º1
DOI
EstadoPublished - jul 1991

Nota bibliográfica

Funding Information:
*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.

Financiación

*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. I thank Eugenia F. Toma, Richard Jensen, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved this paper.

Financiadores
National Science Foundation (NSF)

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Urban Studies

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