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Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences

Producción científica: Article › revisión exhaustiva

1 Cita (Scopus)

Resumen

Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.' However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.

Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (desde-hasta)1578-1598
Número de páginas21
PublicaciónCanadian Journal of Economics
Volumen42
N.º4
DOI
EstadoPublished - nov 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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