State mandates and interest group lobbying

William H. Hoyt; Eugenia Froedge Toma

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(89)90025-X

State mandates and interest group lobbying

William H. Hoyt, Eugenia Froedge Toma

Producción científica: Article › revisión exhaustiva

18 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We apply Becker's (1983) model of political interest groups to state mandates on public expenditures and revenues of local governments. We outline conditions under which interest groups increase localities' output levels above the efficient level but political pressure at the state level will reduce spending toward the efficient level. An implication of our model is that political lobbying at the local level occurs only because of its indirect effects on state-mandated outcomes. Because the state ultimately decides the government service level, interest groups' payoffs to lobbying at the state level generally will exceed those at the local level.

Idioma original	English
Páginas (desde-hasta)	199-213
Número de páginas	15
Publicación	Journal of Public Economics
Volumen	38
N.º	2
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(89)90025-X
Estado	Published - mar 1989

Nota bibliográfica

Funding Information:
*We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant no. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. We thank the participants of the 1988 Public Choice Meetings, the 1988 Meetings of the Western Economics Association, and the Microeconomics Workshop at the University of Kentucky for their comments. We also thank Paul Anglin, Mark Toma, and two referees for helpful comments. ‘See table 93. ‘Restrictions on State and Local Government Tax and Expenditures Powers’, in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1985, pp. 147-149).

Financiación

*We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant no. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. We thank the participants of the 1988 Public Choice Meetings, the 1988 Meetings of the Western Economics Association, and the Microeconomics Workshop at the University of Kentucky for their comments. We also thank Paul Anglin, Mark Toma, and two referees for helpful comments. ‘See table 93. ‘Restrictions on State and Local Government Tax and Expenditures Powers’, in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1985, pp. 147-149).

Financiadores	Número del financiador
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
National Science Foundation (NSF)	RII-8610671

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0047-2727(89)90025-X

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title = "State mandates and interest group lobbying",

abstract = "We apply Becker's (1983) model of political interest groups to state mandates on public expenditures and revenues of local governments. We outline conditions under which interest groups increase localities' output levels above the efficient level but political pressure at the state level will reduce spending toward the efficient level. An implication of our model is that political lobbying at the local level occurs only because of its indirect effects on state-mandated outcomes. Because the state ultimately decides the government service level, interest groups' payoffs to lobbying at the state level generally will exceed those at the local level.",

author = "Hoyt, \{William H.\} and Toma, \{Eugenia Froedge\}",

note = "Funding Information: *We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant no. RII-8610671) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky through the EPSCoR Program. We thank the participants of the 1988 Public Choice Meetings, the 1988 Meetings of the Western Economics Association, and the Microeconomics Workshop at the University of Kentucky for their comments. We also thank Paul Anglin, Mark Toma, and two referees for helpful comments. {\textquoteleft}See table 93. {\textquoteleft}Restrictions on State and Local Government Tax and Expenditures Powers{\textquoteright}, in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1985, pp. 147-149).",

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State mandates and interest group lobbying

Resumen

Nota bibliográfica

Financiación

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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