The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Betül Demirkaya; Patrick Cunha Silva; Brian F. Crisp

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Betül Demirkaya
, Patrick Cunha Silva
, Brian F. Crisp

Political Science

Producción científica: Article › revisión exhaustiva

6 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

Idioma original	English
Número de artículo	102496
Publicación	Electoral Studies
Volumen	79
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496
Estado	Published - oct 2022

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd

Financiación

We thank Will Hella for his valuable assistance collecting some of the data used here. This project received support from the National Science Foundation . “Electoral Systems as Incentive Structures for Interparty and Intraparty Politics” National Science Foundation , Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Accountable Institutions and Behavior Program, Washington, D.C., Grant # SES-2048540 .

Financiadores	Número del financiador
Social Protection and Health Division	SES-2048540
National Science Foundation Arctic Social Science Program

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Political Science and International Relations

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title = "The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems",

abstract = "In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496",

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AU - Cunha Silva, Patrick

AU - Crisp, Brian F.

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N2 - In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

AB - In this research note we reason that campaign strategies that are strategic in “pure” majoritarian systems and “pure” proportional systems may (or may not) change when the two are combined in a mixed-member electoral system with a majoritarian and a proportional tier. We argue that campaign effort by individual candidates should be a function of the tier or tiers in which the candidate is competing and whether he or she expects to be a strong contender. We then test our theorizing with candidate campaign spending data from New Zealand, which has used a mixed-member system since 1996. We find support for our reasoning regarding when the strategies appropriate for pure majoritarian and pure proportional systems should be adapted when applied in their mixed counterparts.

KW - Campaign spending

KW - Campaign strategy

KW - Candidate vulnerability

KW - Mixed member systems

KW - New Zealand

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DO - 10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102496

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JO - Electoral Studies

JF - Electoral Studies

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ER -

The logic of campaign spending in mixed-member electoral systems

Resumen

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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